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Parties upon entering into a contract often fix the
amount of dwiiages to be paid by ond to the other for its
breach, and the courts sustain such agreements, saying,
"that it is competent for persons entering into an
agreement to avoid all future questions as to the amount
of damages which may result from a violation of the
agreement, and agree upon a fixed sum to be paid to the
party who alleges and establishes the breach ; but such
an agreement should be either plainly expressed in writ-
ing or exist by necessary implication from the true
nature of the transaction." The amount thus fixed by
the parties is called liquidated danages.
The important question in regard to them is to
distinguish between then and penalties, or in other word§
is the amount fixed by the contract to be regarded as
liquidated damages or as a penalty ? The importance of
determining this point depends upon the rule of law
that when the damages are stated or liquidated, as it is
termed, the anount stated is the precise sum recovered
or the measure of damages in the particular instance.
Whereas in case of a penalty the amount is not so fixed
the amount named being only as security of the principal
sin or of the actual damages sustained.
One would think that upon a question which so often
arises that the rules governing, would be well settled
and yet it is just the reverse, or in the words of Judge
Earl in K]emp v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 69 N.Y. 58, "the
cases cannot be harmonized and they furnish conspicuous
examples of judicial efforts to make for the parties
wiser and more prudent contracts than they have made
for themselves".
And again Judge Ruggles in 9 N.Y. 5l says, "the
ablest judges have declared that they felt themselves
embarrassed in ascertaining the principle upon which
cases like the present were founded. They have said
that the law relating to liquidated damages has always
been in a state of great uncertainty and has been occa-
sioned by courts endeavoring to make better contracts
for parties than they have made for themselves."
Although the above is true to some extent, yet I
think, that upon a thorough sifting of the cases certain
fundamental rules are obtained which are described in
16 N. Y. 471 by Judge Shankland as "a series of artifi-
cial rules peculiar to contracts of this character, which
while they ostensibly profess to compily with the funda-
mental canons of construction appertaining to legtal
science, contrive to contravene them by artificial dis-
tinctions and limitations".
The object of this thesis is to attempt to reduce
the law, from a confused array of individual cases to
a systematic collection of rules.
When called LIQUIDATED DAMAGES.
In such a case if, independently of the stipulation,
the damages would be wholly uncertain and incapable or
very difficult of being ascertained except by mere
conjecture, then the damages will usually be considered
liquidated if they are so d.enomninated in the instriument,
and the jury is bound in giving its verdict to confine
itself to the sun fixed ; unless it be so rvossly dis-
proportionate to the actual injury that a inan would
start at the bear mention of it, (Clement v. Cash 21
N.Y. 2 6),or unless it is so extortionate or unjust as to
raise the presumption of fraud (6 E. D. Smith 118 ) ;
or unless the damages under some circuns tances would be
merely nominal ; although the sian may appear excessive
(Clement v. Cash 21 N. Y. 253); or the payment of a
smaller sum is secured by a larger (22 Wend. 202).
Reasons for the rule. In Crisbee v. Balton 6 Car. &
P. 240. Best Ch. J. says, "that parties to contracts
from knowing exactly their own situation and objects
can better appreciate the consequences of their failing
to obtain other objects than either judges or juries, and
that ,Aa contract clearly states what shall be paid by
the party who breaks it, to the party to whose prejudice
it is broken, the verdict in an action for the breach
should be for the stipuiLted stun : that a court of law
has no more authority to put a different construction on
the part of an instrument ascertaining the anount of
damages, than it has to decide contrary to any other of
its clauses."
A court of law possesses no dispensing powers ; it
cannot inquire whether the parties have acted wisely
or rashly, in respect to any stipulations they may have
thought proper to introduce into their agreements.
If they are competent to contract with the prudential
rules, the law has fixed as to parties ; and there has
been no fraud, circmLnvention, or illegality in the case
the court is bound to enforce the agreement. Or in the
words of Jacquith v. Hudson j Mich. 123 "where from the
nature of the contract and the subject matter of the
stipulation, for the breach of which the sum is p~iovided,
it is apparent to the court that the actual damages for
the breach are uncertain in their nature, difficult to
ascertain, or impossible to be estimated with certainty;
and where the parties are more intimately acquainted
with all the peculiar circumstances and therefore better
able to compute the actual or probable damages than
courts or juries from any evidence which can be brought
before them, in such cases the law permits the parties
to ascertain for themselves, and provide in the contract
the amount of damages which shall be paid on a breach,
and adopt their computation as the best and most certain
mode of ascertaining the actual damages, or what sum
8will amount to a just compensation."
But even the words "liquidated damages" are not
conclusive, and the courts will inquire into the inten-
tion of the party by examining the other provisions of
the contract, the subject matter, the nature of the ca-
tract, the surrounding circumstances, the ease or dif-
ficulty in ascertaining the amount of damages, the situa-
tion of the parties, and then from the whole decide
whether the sum shall be treated as liquidated damages
or as a penalty fixed to secure perfozinance of the con-
tract.
The policy of the law will not permit parties to
make liquidated damages by calling them as such in
their contract which in its nature is clearly a penalty
or a forfeiture for non-performance. While it allows
them in certain cases to fix their own damages, it will
in no case permit them to evade the law by agroment.
Performance of Lfauy acts. Where the contract stipu-
lates for the performance of many acts and for the pay-
ment of a sum as liquidated damages for the breach,
if the acts to be done are of equal degree and importancq
it is clear that the sum will be held as liquidated dam-
ages ; but when the acts stipulated for are of different
degrees of importance there is more difficulty. Several
cases lay down the rule that when a contract binds the
parties to do several things of different degrees of
importance, and the sum stated is made payable for the
non-performance of any or either, it is a penalty.
There are also cases which qualify the above rule in
this respect, that when the sum which is to be a security
for the performance of an agreement to do several acts,
will in cases of breaches of the agreement, be in some
instances too large and in others too small a conpensa-
tion for the injuries thereby sustained, the sum is to
be considered a penalty.
In 2 Story on Contracts 658, the rule is laid down
in the following words : "where a stun certain is stipu-
lated to be paid for the breach of any one of several
covenants, the sum although called stipulated damages
shall be construed to be a penalty, if damages for the
breach of any one of the covenants is capable of being
ascertained by a jury."
But there are cases which hold that the above rule
has no solid foundation in principle, and the doctrine
no countenance in the cases Astley v. Wfeidon and ]nemble
v. Farren, friom which it is suppose,, to be derived.
In Cotheal v. Talmage 9 N. Y. 556, the court says, "But
I do not understand either of these cases as establishing
any such rule. The principle to be deduced froom them
is, that where a party agrees to do several things one
of which is to pay a sum of money and in case of failure
to perform any or either of the stipulations, the lar-
ger sum is to be refarded in the nature of a penalty ,
and being a penalty in regard to one of the stipulations
to be performed it is a penalty as to all."
In regard to this rule Judge Christiancy in 5 Mich.
12b says, "As a rule of construction or interpretation
of contracts it is radically vicious and tends to a con-
fusion of ideas in the construction of contracts general-
ly. It is this more than anything else which has pro-
duced so much apparent conflict in the decisions upon
this whole subject of penalties and liquidated damages.
It sets at defiance all rulus of interpretation by deny-
ing the intention of the parties to what they, in the
most unambiguous terms, have declared it to be and finds
an intention dianetrically opposite to that which is
clearly expressed."
But there is some reason for the .iule. It is
based on the theory that when men designate one stand-
ard of compensation for violations of contracts of dif-
ferent degrees of importance, or the violation of one of
which would be attended by a loss entirely disproportion-
ate to the former, they cannot have given the matter
that careful, serious consideration, which they should
and could not have made the probable loss the subject
of fair and actual calculation.
But on the whole the rule laid down in Kemble v.
Farren has I think, met with approval. The facts of
the case were as follows : an actor made a contract
not to play with any one but the plaintiff for five
seasons, and the latter promised to pay the former
3 los. each night, and some other small expenses.
The bond provided that if either party violate any of
the stipulations he should forfeit 1,O000 to the other,
notbwayf penalty hut as and by way of liquidated
daies. The defendant refused to act the second season
and a verdict was given the plaintiff for 750Jnotwith-
standing the strong language of the instr~unent. On a
motion to raise the aunount to 1,000 the question caine
up, and Tindall J. held it to be a penalty to secure the
performance of thu various stipulations, and that the
words employed, were either inserted by mistake or for
the purpose of deception, and to evade the well-known
policy of the law in regard to penalties.
7then NOT cailed LIQUIDATED DAMJAGES.
If the sum stated to be paid be not called "Stipu-
lated", gliquidated","fixed" or "settled" damages, or
some other term synonrmous, there is a strong tendency
and preference of the law to regard it as a penalty und
not as liquidated damages, especially where there is any
doubt in regard to the intent of the parties, which al-
ways prevails when satisfactorily ascertained, or where
the contract is for the performance of several stipula-
tions of different degrees of importance, and one large
sum is made payable on the breach of any of them, even
the most trivial, the damnages for which can in no reason-
able probability amount to that sun ; and it may safely
be assuned that generally, when the sum is unaccompanied
by any terms indicating that parties regarded it as
penal, if the case affords no other measure of damag-es
equally satisfactory which are uncertain and depend upon
the discretion of the jury in a large degree, and it is
apparent that they have been made the subject of actual
and fair calculation and adjustment between the parties,
the courts will regard such stun as stipulated damages.
Test for determining whether Penalty or liquidated
damages . All authorities agree that the question is to
be deternined in accordance with the intention of the
contracting parties. Eacli case must depend upon its own
ieculiar and attendant circuinstances,-and the certainty
or uncertainty as to the extent of the damage may then
become the most reliable criterion in the attairnment of
the desired result. In the earlier cases, says Agnew 0.
48 Pa. St. 450, the courts gave more weivht to the lang-
uage of the clause designating the sun as a penalty or
as liquidated damages. The modern authorities attach
greater importance to the meaning and intention of the
parties. Yet the intention is not all controlling, for
in some cases the subject matter and the surroundings
of the contract, will control the intention where equity
absolutely demands it.
vriEN PENAL -0RDS EMPLOYED.
"Then the amnount named is designated in the instru-
ment by such terms as "forfeit", "forfeiture", "penalty",
"penal stun", "fine", "under a penalty", or "under a for-
feiture", and the courts can see no other intention in
the instrunent they are inciinod to regard such a sum as
zi penalty, whenever it can be properly done, in order
that the question of compensation may be given to the
jury and justice may be done to the injured party. In
Tayloe v. Sandford, 7 71heat. 13, Marshall Ch. J. said,
"In general a sun of money in gross to be paid for the
non-performance of an agreement is considered as a pen-
alty, the legal operation of which is to cover the dam-
ages which the party in whose favor the stipulation is
made may have sustained from the breach of the contract
by the opposite party. It will not of course be con-
sidered as liquidated damages, and it will be incLunbent
on the party who claims them as such to show that they
were so considered by the contracting parties. i luch
stronger is the inference in favor of its being a penalty
when it is expressly reserved as one. The parties them-
selves denominate it a penalty, and it would -equire
very strong evidence to authorize the court to say that
their own words do noL express their own intention."
And in general it maj be said that while the terms
mentioned are generally regarded as furnishing almost con-
clusive evidence of an intent to describe a penalty, the
weight to be given to such phraseology depends entirely
upon its connection with the other parts of the contract,
the subject ;ratter and the situation of the parties, and
if the smu be expressly agreed to be paid on such terms
as to adnit of no doubt, because of the nature of the
case the uncertainty of proof, or the difficulty of reaching;
damages by proof have induced them to make damages the
subject of previous adjustmnent, that the ucusign of the
parties was that it should have been regarded other-
wise than as a penalty the language will be disregard-
ed and the sum held to be liquidated damages. This
rule was applied in Jacquith v. Hudson 5 Mich. 123,
where the provision, "under forfeiture of $1,000 to be
collected by said hudson as his damages" was held to be
liquidated damages; and even the word "penalty" has been
held a proper one for explanation and change.
v. Brown 54 Me. 472).
(Dwindell
In Streeter v. Williams 48 Pa.
t. 450, the court in speakin, of the subject said :"Upon
the whole the only general observation we can make is
that in such a case we must loo-K to tlhe language of the
contract, the intention of the parties as gathered from
all its provisions, the subject matter of the contract,
and its surroundings, the ease and difficulty in ineasur-
ing the breach in daanages, and the sun stipulated and
from the whole tather the view which good conscience
and equity o-aght to take of the case."
B 0 N D S.
While a bond is prima facie a penal obligation,
the sun inserted therein has sometimes been treated as
liquidated damages, but generally only when the intent
to treat them as such is manifested by indicative terms.
CCUTPAOTS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE.
While the courts in cases of other contracts have
at times shown no hesitation in holding sums to be penal-
ties even when expressly called liquidated danages, they
are inclined to deal with such a sun mentioned in a con-
tract in restiaint of trade as liquidaied dainages, when
not expressly denominated in the instrutnent as penal,
and although such stuns are not desci'ibed as liquidated
damages. The reason being thaL in such a contract the
damages ure necessarily uncertain in amount and not
easily ascertainable by a jury.
MISCELLANEOUS CONTRACTS.
Stipulations fixing the damaf<es for breach of mar-
riage promises, and also in the case of building con-
tracts or of promises in a contract not to reveal se-
crets, etc., or in the case of contracts to convey real
estate and personal property have been frequently s.s-
tained.
CO2T'}PACTS FOR ThE CALE F GOO)S.
The question whether stipulations fixing the damages
for the b. each of a contract to deliver goods wili be
upheld is a doubtful one. It has been said by some
that they will not as the simn fixed must necessarily be
a penalty, since The legal measure of damages can al-
ways be ascertained, being in fact prescribed by law,
namely, the difference between the market price and the
price agreed to be paid. It is plain that such a view
would be sound in man; cases, but it is equally plain
that there is another class of cases to which this reas-
oning nor conclusion can appl,. In many contracts
for the purchase and sale of personal property there are
no such means of accurately measuring the damges which
If the agreement is for theresult froim a violation.
sale generally of things of a certain kind or descrip-
tion, on a default the vendee can as a rule, ,o into the
market and purchase other articles answering to the de-
scription. The IneLisure of damages would then be the
difference between the amount agreed to be paid and the
market price, and the amount stipulated would of course
be considered a penalty. But where the agreement is
for the sale and delivery of certain specified things,
in some cases the above rule cannot be applied, and so
the certain su stipulated may be considered liquidated
danages and not a penalty. (Shiell v. McNeil 9 Paige 101)
The true doctrine in this class of contracts is doubt-
less to let each case be deternined by its own peculiar
c irctunst an ce s.
SPECIALTIES AND PAEOL CONTACTS.
Some of the cases have attempted to make a distinc-
tion between contracts under seal and parol contracts.
It is sufficient to say that this distinction has met
with very little encouragement from the courts, and in
most opinions it is not spoken of at all. The dis-
tinction rests upon the doctrine of estoppel in regard
to sealed instruments in the matter of consideration
which is regarded with very little favor to-day. But
it can be justified upon the ground that in the case of
sealed instruments the parties may be presuned to have
made a closer study of the probable damnages in case of
a breach than in a parol contract; but I think that this
theory is not sustained by observation and experience.
STIJPULATIONS OVN - AND ABOVJE.
In the case of "damafgus over* and above" the actual
damages, it has been held by a divided court in Dwinell
v. Brown 54 Me. 474, that they can be collected as liqui-
dated damages; but I think that the logic of Judge Ap-
pleton's opinion in that case is sound, that liquidated
danages are fixed, settled and agreed upon in advance
to avoid all litiation as to those actually sustained.
They are compensation for and in lieu of actual damages
never in addition thereto. The language of the agree-
ment leaves no room for any other conclusion than that
the smun fixed is a penalty. It is not for dainages by
the terms of the conti-act. It is not therefore a sum
agreed upon in liquidation of damagesq but is a penalty
and must be so regarded.
PART PERFOPMA11CE.
It is an almost universal rule that part performance
and an acceptance thereof is a bar to the recovery of
the sum stipulated to b2 paid on the breach of a contracL
as liquidated dainaues.
14, Macomber J. said,
In Wheatland v. Taylor 29 Hun.
"But going at large into the
subject, one consideration we think is decisive against
recovery of the sum in question as liquidated daznages,
nanely, there has been a part performance and an accept-
ance thereof x x x x It is like the case of an obliga-
tion to perform two or more independent acts with a
provision for single liquidated damages for non-perfoim-
ance. If one is performed and not the other it is not
a case for the recovery of liquidated damages."
EFFECT OF PARTIAL W1AIVER.
Consent to a partial breach of the contract, such
as an extension of time to the offending party does not
in any way affect the right of the plaintiff to the re-
covery of the amount as liquidated damages. The most
cotmnon way in which partial waiver is brought about is
by the plaintiff extending the time of performance to
the defendant, and on this subject Sutherland J. in
Dearborn v. Cross 7 Cowen 48, remarks, "The enlargement
of time is nothing more than a waiver of strict perform-
ance. The defendant have solicited the delay cannot
urge it as a defense. This would convert an indul-
gence yielded to his solicitation into a weapon, and the
law does not any more than religion justify a return of
evil for good or of ingratitude for benefits."

